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at the moment to see markets purely and simply as tools 
of liberation. And in the final analysis that goes further 
than the idea of competition itself. As Mark Latham 
argues elsewhere in this issue, the public sector would 
have a better reputation and a stronger support base if 
it were actually just a little more public. Too often the 
public sector and its Left supporters are perceived as a 
producers' monopoly against consum ers, and this 
weakens the social legitimacy of both. For instance, the 
close identification of the anti-competition case with the 
Telecom unions in the present controversy probably 
didn't help the former in the public mind.
The most probable outcome of the Telecom debate now 
may well be a modified version of the Beazley proposal, 
w ith  a p p ro p ria te  g u a ra n te e s  o f p ro te c tio n  for
Telecom 's 'community service obligation' (CSO). This 
is a far from perfect outcome for the Left, not least 
because Telecom itself now appears to see the CSO as 
an irksome constraint on its competitiveness. Neverthe­
less, it leaves open to the Left the task of defining just 
how it is to cope with the genie of competition in the 
follow ing instalm ents of the debate over 'm icro- 
economic reform'.
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Lost in SPACE
n the furore over the future of 
Australia's telecommunications the 
Left seems set to fend off privatisation 
at any cost That may include being 
forced into defending Aussat, whose estab­
lishment it bitterly opposed from the start. Kitty 
Eggerking traces Aussat's history and some of the 
options for its disposal.
The idea of an Australian satellite in the 1970s meant 
different things to different people. For the boffins the 
satellite was state-of-the-art technology; for political 
boffins it was not only a gee-whizz space toy but it also 
held out the promise of a new structure for Australia's 
concentrated media; for media owners it presented an 
alternative to the then two-television-station rule and 
an alternate carrier to Telecom. Some groups believed 
that a satellite would break Telecom's monopoly on 
Australian communications; others predicted miracles 
for remote education; still others simply wanted to 
restrain the power of the Australian Telecommunica­
tions Employees Association (ATEA), while others saw 
a satellite as a boon for Australian business.
By 1990 very few of the promises have been delivered, 
and very few of the players have become winners. One 
exception is Kerry Packer, who persuaded Prime Mini­
ster M alcolm  Fraser in 1976 o f the need for an 
Australian satellite and who is one of the few to have 
profited indirectly from Aussat.
(The satellite did lead to the undermining of the legis­
lation controlling the ownership of television stations, 
which was eventually replaced by the ponderous 
'audience reach' rules for media ownership, and, in the
sellers market at the start of the new rules, Packer and 
Rupert Murdoch made $1.8 billion between them on a 
total of four TV stations, valued at a maximum of
$800m.)
Although Fraser envisaged 49% private ownership for 
Aussat, under Labor Aussat is entirely publicly-owned. 
Telecom, which consistently advised against a satellite, 
was forced to take a 25% stake in Aussat, even though 
it saw the future of Australian communications in fibre 
optics. In all the policy documents floated between 
government departments over almost ten years before 
the first of Aussat's three satellites was launched in
1985, the financial viability of the satellite was never 
seriously assessed. Some guesstimates were produced, 
but after the first three years of operation Aussat's 
income was $100m below the estimated $289.4m.
The satellite has proved prohibitively expensive for 
distance education; for broadcasters its costs outweigh 
its benefits; it has proved extremely costly for the com­
m ercial netw orks; and has led to no discernible 
stimulus for Australian industry.
The working life of two of the satellites will expire in 
1993, and these are due to be replaced by two second 
generation satellites in the early 1990s. W hile the exist­
ing satellites have transponders of 12 and 30 watts, the 
second generation satellites will have 50 and 150 watt 
transponders, and current users believe the new 
transponders are too powerful for their needs.
The total cost for purchasing and launching three first 
generation satellites was $283m; the second generation 
satellites are expected to cost $480m.
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W hile the federal govern­
ment has many options from 
which to choose (see box), the 
most likely outcome is that 
Aussat will be sold off to a 
p ow erfu l p rivate  in terest 
seeking to extend its reach in 
in tern ation al com m unica­
tions. The purchase of the un- 
viable Aussat, with debts of 
$900m, would be seen as the 
entry price for this potential­
ly lucrative m arket. Kerry 
P a c k e r 's  C o n so lid a ted  
Press,TNT, Pacific Dunlop,
AM P, E xcom , the B ritish  
Racal Telecom and some of 
the US "babv Bells" have all 
been mentioned recently as 
likely contenders.
It is fitting that private inter­
e s ts  b u ry  A u ssa t, an or­
g a n isa tio n  co n ceiv ed  for 
p rivate  in terests and sus­
tained by the public sector.
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THE OPTIONS
a) Privatisation
Debts of $900m or so make an unattractive selling point for 
Aussat. Only with extensive government guarantees is Aus­
sat likely to have any market appeal, and the government 
would have to inject significant additional equity or write 
off a major portion of Aussat's debt to make the investment 
attractive. If the government, at enormous expense, paid off 
a major portion of Aussat's debt, Aussat would be more 
competitive, but this would hardly reflect relative efficiency.
Of course, public sector users, like the ABC and SBS, could 
be directed to continue to use Aussat, thus guaranteeing it a 
market, but such a measure would not enhance efficiency. 
Alternatively, Aussat could be given access to wider 
markets, but such a decision would have to be based on 
public interest rather than on the narrower consideration of 
making Aussat saleable.
At present the only potential buyers are the large national 
and international players, like one of the US "baby Bells", 
seeking a strategic position in the Australian and interna­
tional markets.
b) Mergers
Mergers with either Telecom or OTC have been repeatedly 
suggested as an alternative to a sell off. This would not really
reduce the losses of Aussat, and would necessitate its debts 
being absorbed by the merging body, thus affecting the 
latte?s profitability. A merger would do little to increase the 
traffic on Aussat, though a merger with OTC could lead to 
OTC shifting its international traffic away from Intelsat to 
Aussat, thereby bringing Aussat into competition with In­
telsat. Telecom is in the strongest position to absorb Aussat's 
losses and to provide the large amount of capital needed for 
future investment.
c) Changing the second generation plan
It can be argued that since Australian satellites have so far 
failed to deliver the promised benefits, future satellites are 
also unlikely to live up to expectations. Thus, one option 
would be to cancel the second generation satellites and shift 
Australia's satellite requirements to Intelsat.
It is also possible at this stage to redesign the second genera­
tion satellites to offer international services to, say, the 
Pacific, though such a scheme would bring Aussat into 
increased competition with OTC and/or Intelsat.
Existing Aussat users have criticised the second generation 
satellites as being unnecessarily powerful. Thus, another 
option would be to scale back the capacity of the second 
generation satellites.
Finally, it may be possible to delay the launching of the 
second generation satellites until almost the expiry of the 
first generation satellites.
ALR: SEPTEMBER 1990
